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Abstract
We exploit a natural experiment to study discrimination in elections. In Illinois
Republican presidential primaries, voters vote for delegates bound to presidential can-
didates, but delegates’ names convey information about their race and gender. We
identify discrimination from variation in vote totals among delegates bound to the
same presidential candidate and who face the same voters. Examining delegate vote
totals from 2000 to 2016, we estimate nonwhite delegates receive 9 percent fewer votes.
We find essentially no gender discrimination. Negligible incentives for statistical dis-
crimination, costs to preferred presidential candidates, and heterogeneity are consistent
with an interpretation of this behavior as taste-based.
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1 Introduction
Racial and ethnic minorities and women are underrepresented among elected o cials in many
countries.1 A large body of research indicates that such underrepresentation contributes to
disparities by race, ethnicity, and gender in a variety of economic and political outcomes.
Electing minority or female o cials has been found to reduce gaps in public goods provision
(e.g., Pande, 2003; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004), resulting in relative gains in health,
education, and criminal justice (Beaman et al., 2012; Clots-Figueras, 2012; Iyer et al., 2012;
Fujiwara, 2015). One potential explanation for the underrepresentation of minorities and
women in elected o ce is voter discrimination, wherein voters are less likely to vote for a
minority or female candidate than an otherwise-identical non-minority or male candidate.
Understanding whether voters discriminate by race and gender and the mechanisms for
any such discrimination are central questions in political economy and would inform sig-
nificant policy debates. Research finds that individuals engage in racial discrimination in
product and labor markets (for review, see Bertrand and Duflo, 2017), but credible evi-
dence on whether they do so when voting is limited. On average, minorities run in di↵erent
electoral districts, at di↵erent times, on di↵erent platforms, with di↵erent party a liations,
for di↵erent o ces, with di↵erent pre-election experience and campaign resources, and so
on, making credible identification of voter discrimination di cult in most electoral settings
(Stephens-Davidowitz, 2014). In settings beyond politics, researchers have identified dis-
crimination with a variety of credible research designs.2 However, it is challenging to adapt
many of these strategies to elections.
In this paper we analyze a natural experiment to study voter discrimination against
nonwhite and female political candidates. This natural experiment occurred in four recent
Illinois Republican presidential primary elections: 2000, 2008, 2012, and 2016.3 Unique fea-
tures of the institutional environment means discrimination in these elections can plausibly
be causally identified. For voters to fully express their preferences in Illinois Republican
presidential primary elections, they must vote for multiple individual candidates for dele-
gate to the Republican National Convention who appear on the primary ballot. In each
congressional district in Illinois, there is a fixed number N 2 {2, 3, 4} of delegate candidates
1For example, in the United States as of 2015, 38 (51) percent of the population was nonwhite (female),
compared to 17 (20) percent of the U.S. Congress (Manning, 2016). For brevity, in the paper we refer to
non-Hispanic whites only as whites, and all other groups as nonwhites. We often use “racial discrimination”
as a shorthand for racial and ethnic discrimination.
2These include audit studies (e.g., Pager et al., 2009), correspondence studies (Bertrand and Mullainathan,
2004), natural experiments (Goldin and Rouse, 2000; Price and Wolfers, 2010), and lab and field experiments
(for review, see Guryan and Charles, 2013; Bertrand and Duflo, 2017).
3We use these years because relevant data was not available prior to 2000 and the 2004 Republican pres-
idential primary was not contested, as President George W. Bush was running for renomination unopposed.
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who appear on the ballot for each presidential candidate, and voters cast votes for up to N
delegates. The top N vote-getting delegates in each district win and are bound to vote for
their presidential candidate at the convention. However, the delegates’ names also appear
on ballots, and the delegates’ names convey information about their race and gender.
To identify racial and gender discrimination in this setting, we exploit the fact that we
observe the vote totals of multiple delegates with the same platform—that is, bound to
the same presidential candidate—on the same ballots, and voted on by the same voters, all
of whom voters should select to fully support their preferred presidential candidate. Our
identification strategy is to examine variation in delegate vote totals by delegate race and
gender within such groups of delegates. For example, suppose the delegates for Mitt Romney
in Illinois’ first congressional district in 2012 were named Tom, Dick, and Jose´. To maximize
the value of their ballot, a Romney supporter should cast their three votes for Tom, Dick, and
Jose´. However, to the extent Romney supporters engage in racial or ethnic discrimination,
some may vote for Tom and Dick but not for Jose´, leaving Jose´’s vote totals lower than Tom
and Dick’s vote totals. We observe 816 unique natural experiments of this form.
This election design has important advantages for studying discrimination. In typical
elections, voters may value myriad dimensions of candidates—such as ideology, competence,
or past performance—many of which may correlate with candidate demographics and few of
which are perfectly observable. Here the voter’s problem is dramatically more straightfor-
ward: For voters seeking to fully support their preferred presidential candidate, a delegate
candidate’s sole relevant dimension is the presidential candidate to whom they are bound,4
which is clearly printed on ballots, such that both voters and researchers can perfectly ob-
serve it. White and male delegate candidates running alongside nonwhite and female delegate
candidates on the same platform, for the same o ce, on the same ballots, in front of the
same voters therefore provide a naturally-occurring control group that allow us to rule out
factors that would confound other research designs.
Analyzing variation in delegate vote totals among delegates bound to the same presiden-
tial candidate and who appear on the same ballots in front of the same voters, we find that
delegates receive approximately 9 percent fewer votes when their names indicate they are
not white. We also find, however, essentially no discrimination against women: Delegates
whose names indicate they are female receive on average about the same number of votes
as delegates whose names indicate they are male, if not slightly more in some specifications.
4In Section 4.3, we consider other dimensions voters may value besides the presidential candidate to whom
delegates are bound, such as if a delegate is an existing elected o cial, is a “local notable,” or is listed higher
on the ballot. We find these dimensions are uncorrelated with delegate race. Serving as a delegate most
resembles hobbyist consumption, rather than a career investment. See Appendix H for discussion, including
quotes from convention delegates about why they volunteered to attend.
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Examining the results by ethnicity, we find clear evidence of discrimination against delegates
whose names indicate they are Hispanic, East Asian, Middle Eastern, or Indian. Our esti-
mates for discrimination against black delegates are similar, although there are few clearly
black delegates, making our estimates of anti-black discrimination less precise.
We next consider what theoretical mechanisms could account for this discrimination.
Discrimination may be taste-based—wherein voters act as if they have preferences over can-
didate race and gender (Becker, 1957). It may also be statistical—wherein voters accurately
use candidates’ race and gender to infer non-racial or non-gender dimensions such as ideology
and can advance these non-demographic preferences by discriminating (Phelps, 1972; Ak-
erlof, 1976). Taste-based discrimination is of particular interest because it implies that voters
act as if they pay a “psychic cost” (Becker, 1957) of voting for candidates from disfavored de-
mographic groups and accept trade-o↵s on candidates’ non-demographic dimensions to avoid
paying these “psychic costs.” As compared to markets (List, 2004), taste-based discrimi-
nation may be especially likely in elections because individual voting decisions are usually
inconsequential for outcomes. Nevertheless, taste-based discrimination may be consequen-
tial in aggregate if many voters engage in it, reducing both minority representation and the
appeal of election winners on other dimensions.
Institutional features of the setting we study suggest tastes—and, in particular, the “psy-
chic costs” of voting for delegates of a disfavored race or gender—as the likely mechanism
for the discrimination we detect. In most electoral settings it would be di cult to distin-
guish between taste-based and statistical discrimination.5 Taste-based discrimination occurs
when individuals behave as if they prefer candidates inferior on non-racial or non-gender
dimensions in order to avoid incurring “psychic costs” from selecting otherwise-preferred
candidates with disfavored demographics. Voters must behave in precisely this manner to
discriminate against delegates in this environment. If voters do not vote for all their pre-
ferred presidential candidates’ nonwhite delegates, this advantages delegates for presidential
candidates they prefer less, undermining the nomination prospects of voters’ preferred pres-
idential candidates. In addition, although we cannot rule out all alternative interpretations,
incentives for statistical discrimination should be naturally absent. Under convention rules,
delegates have essentially no discretion. Even if a rational voter were unaware that dele-
gates had no discretion, to engage in statistical discrimination, she would need to maintain
beliefs we view as implausible: that nonwhite delegates bound to her presidential candidate
of choice would be less likely to vote for the voter’s presidential candidate of choice at the
5Existing approaches in the gender literature include comparisons of vote totals controlling for observables,
survey-based experiments (e.g., Teele et al., 2018), and testing implications of voter bias on politician quality
(Anzia and Berry, 2011; Ferreira and Gyourko, 2014; Vogl, 2014).
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convention than white delegates bound to an opposing presidential candidate.6
Heterogeneity in the magnitude of discrimination across candidates, elections, and geog-
raphy is also consistent with predictions of a taste-based interpretation. Most significantly,
consistent with taste-based discrimination also a↵ecting voters’ choices of presidential can-
didates, and not only delegate candidates, we estimate that voters for nonwhite presidential
candidates harbor significantly weaker racially-discriminatory tastes than voters for white
presidential candidates. We also find that voters for a female presidential candidate actually
discriminate in favor of female delegate candidates. These results are consistent with voters’
racial and gender tastes having stakes for their choices of presidential candidates, as voters
appear to endogenously select out of voting for nonwhite and female presidential candidates
in a manner strongly correlated with our estimates of their collective tastes. In addition,
consistent with Becker (1957), discrimination also appears to decrease when it is more costly
to voters’ preferred presidential candidates: Voter discrimination against nonwhites is less
when voters are more likely to be decisive, although we find it still appears to persist even in
the most competitive elections. The geographic areas where discrimination appears strongest
is also in line with expectations from prior research.
We present a variety of robustness checks on our results. We show the results are similar
when we use each of three di↵erent strategies to measure the racial signals delegates’ names
send voters: a measure based on the background of others with their last name in data pro-
vided by the U.S. Census, a measure based on anthropological data about the etymology of
their full names, and a measure based on Americans’ subjective perceptions based on their
full names. We further show that ballot-order e↵ects do not drive the results. In addition, we
construct three measures of possible prior information voters could have about delegates; our
results are robust to excluding delegates about whom voters might have had other informa-
tion and to controlling for this information. We also consider alternative interpretations of
the results, such as residual incentives for statistical discrimination, voter misunderstandings
about the primary, voter signaling to presidential candidates or party elites, voter indi↵er-
ence across presidential candidates, and voter inferences about presidential candidates on the
basis of nonwhite delegates. Although we cannot rule out alternative mechanisms beyond
taste-based discrimination related to voter misunderstanding and signaling, Section 4.4 and
6It is therefore unlikely that voters with mistaken beliefs about the primary and delegates would perceive
incentives for statistical discrimination. We consider the plausibility of statistical discrimination in more
detail in Sections 2 and 4.4, as well as in Appendix J. Under convention rules, even if delegates fail to
appear or fail to cast their vote for the presidential candidate to whom they are bound, their vote is counted
for the presidential candidate to whom they are bound regardless. Moreover, Becker (1957) defined taste-
based discrimination to encompass inaccurate beliefs about minorities: “An employer may refuse to hire
a [black person] solely because he erroneously underestimates their economic e ciency. His behavior is
discriminatory...[A] taste for discrimination incorporates both prejudice and ignorance” (p. 16–17).
4
Appendix J provide further evidence on and discussion of these alternatives.7
We find voter racial discrimination likely had aggregate consequences for delegate election
outcomes. It is likely that discrimination against several presidential candidates’ nonwhite
delegates reduced their vote totals su ciently that white delegates for less-preferred presiden-
tial candidates won and served instead.8 This illustrates the two consequences of taste-based
racial discrimination in elections appear to have been realized in this environment: In reduc-
ing nonwhite representation, voters who discriminated also elected candidates less appealing
to them on other dimensions. To contextualize the magnitude of our point estimate, we
also o↵er back-of-the-envelope calculations that apply our estimate to Republican primary
elections for the U.S. House of Representatives. Discrimination of this magnitude would
decrease the share of nonwhites in the U.S. House by about 3 percentage points. Voter
discrimination against racial-minority candidates therefore plausibly contributes to their un-
derrepresentation in government, which other research has found lies at the root of important
social disparities.
Like much previous research on discrimination (e.g., Goldin and Rouse, 2000; Price and
Wolfers, 2010; Doleac and Stein, 2013; Rubinstein and Brenner, 2014; Glover et al., 2017), we
exploit an institution whose unique properties facilitate otherwise-elusive causal inference.
Therefore, we carefully consider the generalizability of our findings as to how detecting dis-
crimination in this setting should inform views of the plausible extent of discrimination in
other elections. The underrepresentation of minorities and women in the U.S. is most exten-
sive among Republican elected o cials, making Republican primaries—the de-facto elections
in about half of U.S. electoral districts—of particular substantive importance. Our finding
that voters appear to endogenously select into voting for presidential candidates in a man-
ner strongly correlated with our estimates of their collective tastes is consistent with voters’
racial and gender tastes having stakes for their choices of presidential candidates. However,
discrimination could be greater in other primaries where voters may have less information or
weaker preferences. The presidential primaries we study are relatively high-stakes elections,
determining the Republican presidential nominee, and where evidence indicates voters have
strong candidate preferences. In addition, our estimates can capture only the “psychic cost”
of voting for nonwhites and women, not any “psychic costs” of being represented by them
nor statistical discrimination against them. Accounting for such distinctions, the total dis-
advantage for nonwhite candidates in other elections due to voter discrimination may well
7There we discuss in more detail why voter misunderstanding should not produce incentives for statistical
discrimination. We also fielded a survey of Illinois Republican primary voters that found limited voter
misunderstanding or perceived incentives for statistical discrimination. However, 10 percent said they felt
“uncomfortable” voting for nonwhites, consistent with taste-based discrimination.
8In Section 3.6 we discuss why presidential campaigns may nominate nonwhite delegates despite this cost.
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be larger. On the other hand, discrimination could be smaller in general elections where
partisan preferences may be more important, or in elections where voters have on average
weaker racial tastes.
The di↵erence in our results for race versus for gender merits an additional comment. In
particular, our finding that voters do not appear to discriminate against women is consonant
with evidence from gender quotas (Baltrunaite et al., 2014, 2019; Esteve-Volart and Bagues,
2012; Casas-Arce and Saiz, 2015; Besley et al., 2017) and survey experiments (Schwarz
and Coppock, 2019) that suggest political institutions, rather than voters, as the principal
obstacle to increasing female political representation in Western democracies. On the other
hand, the discrimination we detect against nonwhites fits with Washington (2006), who
shows that a fraction of white voters turns out specifically to vote against nonwhite U.S.
House candidates. Our results therefore lend support to claims in the literature on gender
that underrepresentation likely results from di↵erent combinations of contributing factors
for nonwhites and women.
We explain the context and natural experiment in greater detail in Section 2. Section
3 introduces our main data sources. Section 4 presents our empirical strategy, results, and
robustness checks. Section 5 examines the pattern of heterogeneity in discrimination and
argues it is consistent with a taste-based interpretation. Section 6 discusses implications
for other elections, U.S. election law, and strategies for increasing nonwhite and female
representation.
2 The Illinois Republican Presidential Primary
2.1 Why Study Republican Primaries?
Why are nonwhites and women underrepresented among U.S. o ceholders? Stylized facts
about U.S. politics suggest discrimination among Republican voters in primary elections may
play a significant role. First, U.S. voters have strong partisan preferences, with relatively
weaker preferences among candidates of the same party (Green et al., 2002), implying that
any taste for a candidate’s race, gender, or ethnicity may be especially determinative in pri-
mary rather than general elections. Second, white Republican voters have been more racially
conservative than white Democratic voters since the 1960s civil rights realignment (Kuziemko
and Washington, 2018). Nevertheless, Republican primaries constitute the de-facto election
in about half of U.S. electoral districts, where Republican nominees reliably win in general
elections. To the extent voter taste-based discrimination a↵ects the demographic composi-
tion of U.S. o ceholders, one thus might expect it to do so especially through Republican
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Table 1: Racial and Gender Composition of O ceholders and Voters by Party
% Nonwhite % Female
Republicans Democrats Republicans Democrats
U.S. House Members 4% 31% 9% 31%
Primary Election Voters 11% 35% 51% 60%
Party Identifiers 15% 43% 53% 59%
General Election Voters 23% 54%
Notes: This table reports the national shares nonwhite and female of U.S. House members, primary voters,
party identifiers, and general election voters who are Republicans or Democrats. Data on the racial and
ethnic composition of U.S. House Members from 2006-2014 was collected by Fraga (2013). Data on the
gender composition of U.S. House Members was collected by the Center for American Women and Politics
(2016). Data on the racial, ethnic, and gender composition of primary-election voters, general-election voters,
and party identifiers is from the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), a large survey of
American voters (N = 64,600) (Ansolabehere and Scha↵ner, 2017). Whether CCES participants voted is
measured from administrative records. Party identification is measured by the survey question “Generally
speaking, do you think of yourself as a...?” with answers that include “Democrat” and “Republican.”
primary elections.
Consistent with this possibility, Table 1 shows that both nonwhites and women are
underrepresented among Republican U.S. House members relative to the populations of
Republican primary voters and adults who identify as Republicans. These disparities are
present but notably smaller among Democrats. Discrimination in Republican primaries could
contribute to these descriptive patterns because, in a considerable share of U.S. electoral
districts, whoever the Republican Party nominates is likely to win the general election.
Any racial, ethnic, or gender discrimination in Republican primaries in such Republican-
leaning districts may therefore alter the demographic composition of U.S. elected o cials.
While of course other plausible explanations exist for these descriptive patterns, the natural
experiment we analyze provides new evidence consistent with voter racial discrimination in
Republican primaries as a contributor.
2.2 Design of the Primary
We study Illinois Republican primary elections, taking advantage of their unique design.
The “delegate loophole primary” design of the Illinois Republican presidential primary is
unique within the United States.9 Voters vote separately for some number of delegates—
9Delegate loophole primaries were once common in the U.S. but were largely replaced by candidate-based
primaries in the 1970s as part of reforms intended to empower voters in primary elections (Shafer, 1988).
Di culty in locating election returns in other states prior to the 1970s, and the low number of nonwhite
delegate candidates who are likely to have run at that time, limit our ability to extend our analysis to these
earlier primaries. Some other states also list delegates on ballots, but in none of these other states does
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Figure 1: Section of Sample Ballot
Notes: This figure shows a relevant delegate-selection section of the 2016 Republican primary ballot from
McLean County in Illinois’ 18th Congressional District. See Appendix Figure A1 for a copy of the full ballot.
usually three—who are bound to represent a given presidential candidate at the Republican
National Convention. If elected, the delegate candidates have essentially no discretion in the
votes they cast at the Republican National Convention. Rule 16(a)(2) of the 2012 and 2016
Republican National Conventions specifies that delegates who do not vote for the candidate
to which they are bound have that vote canceled, and the Secretary of the Convention records
the vote as for the candidate to which the delegate was bound. Additional features of these
elections, reviewed in Section 4.4, make it unlikely that even voters unaware of this rule
would perceive incentives for statistical discrimination. In all the elections we study, about
80 percent of the Illinois delegation is allocated in this manner.10
Direct votes for these delegates occur at the congressional-district level as follows. In
2016, Illinois had 18 congressional districts, and each district was allocated three delegates
to the Republican nominating convention. Before the election, each presidential campaign
nominates three candidates for delegate in each of the 18 congressional districts. The ballot
instructs voters to vote for up to three delegate candidates, who need not be bound to support
the institutional environment permit the same inferences as here. For example, in some other states, the
delegate vote totals only determine which particular delegates have the opportunity to represent a particular
candidate and not the total number of delegates that a presidential candidate gets. We are not aware of
similar natural experiments in other countries.
10About 20 percent of the delegation is independently allocated to the delegates determined in two other
ways: delegates set aside for prominent party leaders and delegates bound to the winner of the statewide
“beauty contest.” These delegates do not appear on the ballot.
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the same presidential candidate. For example, Figure 1 provides part of the relevant delegate-
candidate section of the ballot from McLean County in the 18th congressional district of
Illinois in the 2016 election. While the Jeb Bush and Chris Christie campaigns nominated
three delegates with names voters likely perceived as white, the Donald Trump campaign
nominated two likely-white delegates and one, Sandra Yeh, who voters likely perceived as
nonwhite—0 out of 30 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers we showed this name expected Yeh
to be white. A Trump voter who pays “psychic costs” in voting for nonwhites could vote
for only Trump’s two likely-white delegate candidates and not for Yeh. The performance of
Yeh versus her white counterparts on the same ballot is thus one “natural experiment” of
the 816 we observe, within which we analyze variation in delegate vote totals.
As Figure 1 shows, names of delegates are printed in large, bold font, followed by the
last name of the presidential candidate to whom they are bound. Ballots provide no other
information to voters. Delegates are grouped by presidential candidate, such that voters can
easily identify delegates bound to their preferred presidential candidate.11
We exploit three unique features of this setting to study discrimination. First, to iden-
tify discrimination, the presence of white delegate candidates running alongside the non-
white delegate candidates who appear on the same ballots, in front of the same voters,
bound to the same presidential candidates provides a naturally-occurring control group for
estimating discrimination. Second, indicating tastes as the likely mechanism for any ob-
served discrimination, there are essentially no incentives for rational voters to engage in
statistical discrimination. Since delegates have no meaningful discretion if elected and are
merely a mechanism for voting for a given presidential candidate, delegate names vary the
“psychic cost” (Becker, 1957) of voting for a possibly-nonwhite delegate without varying
relevant information about the consequences of that vote, which are plausibly fixed within
the individual “experiments” we analyze. In other elections, voters may rationally infer
nonwhite candidates di↵er on other dimensions, such as ideology or competence; here the
only relevant dimension is the presidential candidate to which the delegate is bound, which
is printed on the ballot. Third, any such discrimination entails trade-o↵s—the essence of
taste-based discrimination—as it undermines voters’ preferred presidential candidates’ nom-
ination prospects.12 The election design therefore creates opportunities to credibly identify
voter discrimination in this context—and, given the costs of discrimination and the natural
absence of incentives for statistical discrimination, suggest taste-based discrimination as the
11The same electoral process occurs for alternate delegates, for whom voters vote simultaneously. Our
sample pools normal and alternate delegates.
12To the extent voters receive expressive utility for voting for their chosen presidential candidate (Pons
and Tricaud, 2018; Spenkuch, 2018), engaging in racial discrimination also denies them this utility. See
Appendix B for further discussion.
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likely mechanism. To fix ideas, we present a formalization of the voter’s decision problem in
these elections in Appendix B. Section 4.4 and Appendix J discuss further the plausibility
of alternative interpretations of the discrimination we observe beyond tastes.
2.3 Elections in the Dataset
A contested Illinois Republican presidential primary took place on March 21, 2000; February
5, 2008; March 21, 2012; and March 15, 2016. Except in 2000, these primaries occurred
relatively early in the primary season, before a “presumptive nominee” was established but
nevertheless with a clear front-runner. The median district-level contest was decided by only
2,541 voters. For further context on the elections we study, see Appendix C.
2.4 Candidates for Presidential Convention Delegates
There were 2,386 unique delegate candidacies in Illinois across the four presidential primaries
included in this study. We drop from the sample six who ran as uncommitted to a presidential
candidate and 62 whose names cannot be coded by gender, as we discuss below.
If voters are more likely to vote for delegates whose names they recognize, and if white
or male delegate candidates are especially likely to hold other political positions that would
generate name recognition, we may uncover spurious relationships between delegate candi-
dates’ race, ethnicity, or gender and their vote totals. To assess this possibility, we obtained
information on delegates’ backgrounds that some voters might plausibly know. In particular,
we instructed research assistants to complete meticulously detailed “background checks” on
all the delegates in our sample, searching for whether they have ever held public o ce, a
local Republican Party leadership position, or other non-political posts. We then divided of-
fices into four categories: major o ce (e.g. U.S. Representative), state legislature (e.g. State
Senator), minor o ce (e.g. county board member, town mayor), or no o ce. Appendix D
details our data collection procedure.
Table 2 reports the number of unique delegates in each category. 40.7 percent of delegates
in our sample have held public o ce or similar leadership positions, the vast majority of
whom were minor o cials, such as members of their local Republican party committee or
members of town councils.13 White delegates are not significantly more likely to be o cials
than nonwhite delegates, nor is their distribution across levels of o ce notably di↵erent from
nonwhite delegates. However, male delegates are somewhat more likely to be o cials than
13Due to data limitations, these positions reflect the highest o ce we detected at any time for a delegate.
See Appendix Table A1 for descriptive statistics on the number of unique delegates holding each o ce broken
down by specific o ce.
10
female delegates, and they are distributed di↵erently across o ce levels, though the statistical
significance of this di↵erence is marginal. Considering the distribution over specific o ces
in Appendix Table A1, however, we reject the null of independence with respect to delegate
race and gender. These results suggest a need to check our estimates of discrimination for
bias due to di↵erential o ceholding, as we do in Section 4.3.
Table 2: O ceholding by Race and Gender of Delegate
Count and Percentage of Column
By Race By Gender
Level of O ce White Nonwhite Male Female Total
Major O ce 18 4 19 3 22
0.84 2.22 1.14 0.47 0.95
State Legislature 166 11 131 46 177
7.76 6.11 7.83 7.14 7.64
Minor O ce 687 57 553 191 744
32.13 31.67 33.03 29.66 32.10
No O ce 1,267 108 971 404 1,375
59.26 60.00 58.00 62.73 59.32
Total 2,138 180 1,674 644 2,318
Notes: This table reports the distribution of the delegate population across four o ce categories by race
and gender. Major o ces include the governorship and U.S. House of Representatives membership; minor
o ces include City Council or Board of Education seats. We dichotomize the MTurk race measure and SSA
gender measure at 0.5. The  2(4) statistics by race and gender are respectively 3.95 (p = 0.27) and 5.88
(p = 0.12). See Appendix Table A1 for a detailed tabulation of delegates by type of o cial and race: Results
di↵er in the test of independence with respect to gender but not with respect to race. See Appendix D for
a discussion of the data collection process.
2.5 The Illinois Republican Primary Electorate
Mirroring national patterns, Illinois Republican primary voters appear to be almost entirely
non-Hispanic whites but are approximately balanced with respect to gender. Two separate
data sources suggest this same conclusion. First, Appendix Table A2 presents demographic
summary statistics on Republican primary voters in Illinois from complete-count adminis-
trative voter records from the Illinois Secretary of State with demographics estimated by the
firm Catalist. Using their names and neighborhood racial composition, Catalist estimates
that, of the people that o cial records indicate voted in the 2008, 2012, or 2016 Republican
primaries, over 95 percent are non-Hispanic white and 51 percent are men. Data from the
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2000 election are unavailable. Second, of Illinois Republicans who participated in a large-
sample national survey, the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (Ansolabehere, 2010),
and who administrative records show voted in the 2008 primary, 97 percent indicated they
were white, and 55 percent indicated they were men (N = 189 Illinois Republicans who
voted in the 2008 primary).
Given the paucity of nonwhite voters, these elections provide little opportunity to dis-
tinguish bias towards coethnics from bias against nonwhites by whites and nonwhites, but
also largely eliminate the risk of attenuation of our estimates due to opposite-sign coethnic
biases. Conversely, because of statewide and county-level approximate gender balance, we
emphasize our results for gender discrimination are net results and that we are mute as to
whether men and women discriminate in favor or against co-gender delegates.
Catalist data also indicate mean voter age was 60. Voters lived in Census block groups
where, on average, one third of residents were college graduates and median annual per
capita income was about $70,000. These averages fit with national data which finds that
primary voters tend to be whiter, older, more educated, and higher-income than nonvoters.
Propitiously for the external validity of our findings, available data suggest Illinois seems
not far from the median U.S. state in terms of racially-discriminatory tastes. While the
strength of racial tastes do not lend themselves to easy quantitative measurement, Ap-
pendix Table A3 reports data on rates of racially-charged Google searches, 2.4 million results
of self-administered Race Implicit Association Tests, the per-capita number of active hate
organizations identified by the Southern Poverty Law Center, and the per-capita rate of
race-related hate crimes as reported by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. None of these
measures identify Illinois as a state with unusually high or low levels of racial animus.
Illinois Republican voters appear to place utility on voting for their preferred presiden-
tial candidates in these contests. We show this in two ways. First, comparing presidential
“beauty contest” and delegate vote totals, Appendix Figure A2 shows that delegates receive
about 84 percent of the votes cast for their candidate in the “beauty contest” totals, sug-
gesting the vast majority of “beauty contest” voters also participate in delegate contests.
Second, Appendix Table A4 shows that primary election turnout was 4–7 p.p. (18–27 per-
cent) higher on average as a share of the voting-eligible population in presidential than in
non-presidential election years from 1980 to 2016, controlling for Senate election years, even
though the non-presidential years during this period featured contested Illinois governor
primaries and the presidential years did not.
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3 Data
3.1 Vote Totals
We observe o cial vote counts by delegate candidate at the county–congressional district
level for every delegate candidate and county–district in Illinois in 2000, 2008, 2012, and
2016. A “county–congressional district” refers to the intersection of a county and congres-
sional district: Some congressional districts span multiple counties and we observe vote totals
separately within these county intersections for each delegate.14 These county–district inter-
sections are mutually exclusive and exhaustive of Illinois voters and geography. Our unit of
observation is each delegate and county–district. Importantly, we do not observe voting at
the ballot level, and so we cannot study individuals’ joint voting decisions, nor decisions to
“undervote” (i.e., not exhaust all N votes for delegates) versus spreading votes among the
delegates of multiple presidential candidates.15
Our sample spans 2,318 unique delegate candidates and 19,711 vote-count observations,
as we observe how a delegate candidate performed in multiple county-congressional district
intersections, representing a total of 22.3 million votes. The mean (median) delegate can-
didate received 1,133 (306) votes in each county-congressional district area. All vote-count
data were drawn and are publicly available from the online database of the Illinois State
Board of Elections. The data also include the name of the delegate candidate as printed on
the ballot, which is fixed at the congressional district level.
Throughout this paper, we refer to delegate candidates who run in the same county–
district, in the same year, for the same presidential candidate, and for the same potential
set of regular or alternate delegate positions as in the same “cell.” Recall that to maximize
the value of their vote voters should vote for all of their preferred presidential candidates’
delegate candidates in the same cell and have no votes left after that. Delegates in the
same cell are the most suited to comparison, in that factors related to geography, year,
and presidential candidate are all constant within cells and that all remaining variation is
between delegate candidates. In all our specifications we include fixed e↵ects for each cell.
3.2 Inferring Delegate Race and Ethnicity
We measure how voters should perceive delegate candidates’ race and ethnicity from their
names in three ways: using 2000 U.S. Census data, using a proprietary anthropological
14The same geographic unit is used, for example, in Autor et al. (2016). Total votes by district, not county,
determine election outcomes. A delegate candidate can only run in one congressional district.
15Appendix Figure A2 shows that delegates receive about 84 percent of the votes cast for their candidate
in the “beauty contest.”
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database of full-name frequencies (Onolytics), and using guesses of workers on Amazon Me-
chanical Turk (MTurk). These three sources yield two objective measures of likely race and
ethnicity (Census and Onolytics) and one measure of subjective racial and ethnic perception
(MTurk). For all three measures, we distinguish between delegates who are white, black,
Hispanic/Latino, and Asian; for Onolytics and MTurk, we further make further distinctions
among Asians. Throughout the paper we present estimates using all our measures of the
racial and ethnic information in voters’ names to demonstrate the robustness of our results.
3.2.1 Census Data on Last Names
Public-use tabulations from the 2000 U.S. Census report, for each last name occurring 100
or more times in Census returns, the count and racial and ethnic composition of individuals
with the last name. The tabulations include data for 151,671 last names and define racial
categories as non-Hispanic white only, black only, Hispanic only, Asian or Pacific Islander
only, and several other smaller categories. We use only the specified four categories.16
Similar to Fryer and Levitt (2004), we match delegates in our sample with the Census
racial-composition data. Our measure is the racial composition of the U.S. population with
the same last name and is thus continuous. About 87 percent (2,073 of 2,380) of delegates’
last names match an entry in the Census data exactly. For the remaining names, we identify
the nearest match in the Census data for each delegate last name by minimizing the Jaro–
Winkler distance, a common measure of string similarity in record matching. Appendix
Table A5 presents estimates including these inexact matches. The results remain similar,
confirming that our results are una↵ected by omitting delegates with rare names.17
3.2.2 Onolytics Classifier of Full Names
We also use a commercial software package to estimate the races of the delegate population.
Onolytics is developed in Mateos (2014) and classifies names by a proprietary international
database of over 1 million last names and 500,000 first names. While Onolytics provides
detailed ethnicity categories, we collapse these to seven: black, Asian, Hispanic/Latino,
16There is significant missingness of racial-composition data for the smaller racial categories in the less-
common last names in the tabulation and no delegate-candidate last names in our sample matched with
last names that Census data identified as substantively (10 percent or more) linked to these smaller racial
categories. These racial categories we omit are: American Indian or Alaska Native only, Native Hawaiian or
Other Pacific Islander only, and Two or More Races.
17One advantage of the Census measure’s reliance on last names only is that the racial signals last names
send are not contaminated by class signals individuals’ parents might have sent when choosing racially
distinctive first names (Fryer and Levitt, 2004). This is also less of a problem in our context, as Asian and
Hispanic names send opposite class signals, yet we find discrimination against both groups.
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Indian, Middle Eastern, non-Hispanic white ethnic, and non-ethnic white.18 We define the
nonwhite categories to correspond as closely as possible to those in our other two measures
of delegate race and ethnicity. The measure is dichotomous.
3.2.3 MTurk Perceptions of Full Names
To measure voter-perceived race of delegates, we paid MTurk workers to guess the race of
delegates from their provided full names. We followed the procedure of Kuziemko et al. (2015)
to ensure high-quality guesses, in particular limiting the sample of potential participants to
“master” MTurk workers who live in the United States. We paid for 30 guesses for each
delegate name to yield reasonably precise estimates of perceived race. Our measure of race
is the racial composition of these guesses and is thus continuous. See Appendix F for MTurk
survey details and Appendix I for an analysis of attenuation bias due to measurement error.
An advantage of the MTurk measure is we could ask MTurk workers to provide their per-
ceptions in finer ethnic categories than available from the U.S. Census. MTurk workers coded
the ethnicity of each delegate as one of six categories: white, black, Hispanic, Asian, Indian,
or Middle Eastern. By comparison, the Census definition of “Asian or Pacific Islander” spans
individuals of East Asian, Indian, Middle Eastern, and Pacific Islander heritage.
3.3 Inferring Delegate Gender and Age
We also capture information about delegate gender and age contained in first names.
American first names robustly predict gender. To map delegates to likely genders, we
use the baby-name file of the Social Security Administration (SSA) from 1930 to 2012,
which covers all individuals born after 1930 and issued a Social Security card. 95 percent of
delegates have first names that are either more than 95-percent male or more than 95-percent
female in the SSA data. 62 delegate first names cannot be gender-coded and are dropped
from our main analysis: These first names are either entirely missing from the ballot and
thus our data or cannot be exact-matched in the SSA file. We use a continuous estimate of
likely gender, the probability that a delegate is female is the proportion of U.S. citizens born
with the same first name who are female at birth.
18See Appendix E for the details on the collapse. We define the white-ethnic category motivated by
historical evidence for discrimination against “white ethnics” and for the attenuation of social distinctions
among whites in the U.S. in the 20th century (e.g., Roediger, 2005). We define white ethnics in terms of the
Onolytics classification for names of Southern European, Eastern European, and Jewish origin. The non-
ethnic white category therefore includes names that are of Northern European, Central European, English,
or Celtic origin. We generally collapse “white ethnic” and white names but also present them separately as
a robustness check.
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First names are also informative about age due to changes over time in the relative name
popularity. To map delegates to their likely ages, we use the SSA baby-name file to find the
year in which a name attained its maximal share of births. About half of all births occur
within 10 years of this “modal year.” Among delegates, the median modal year is 1955, with
a standard deviation of 20 years.19
3.4 Measuring Other Delegate Attributes
We also gathered information on delegates that voters can less readily infer from names and,
as such, that they may be less likely to know. We determined delegates’ home counties
and Census block groups from the residential addresses reported in o cial candidacy filings.
We use these data in two ways below. First, they allow us to restrict the sample to voters
who, due to physical distance, are least likely to have information about a delegate beyond
what is reported on the ballot. Second, we use block-group characteristics as a proxy for
delegate socioeconomic status: in particular, the share with at least a bachelor’s degree and
log median household income.
3.5 Descriptive Statistics on Delegate Race and Ethnicity
To illustrate the racial and ethnic information in delegate names, Table 3 reports the five
names identified as whitest and least white using the Census and MTurk whiteness measures;
the dichotomous Onolytics measure does not enable such a ranking. Both measures identify
names such as “Carol Hornickle” and “Mike Marron” as white and “Baba Padmanabhan”
and “Noella Chung” as nonwhite. In Appendix Figure A5, we plot kernel density estimates
for these measures. Most names in the sample are identified as very likely belonging to
non-Hispanic whites, with a heavy left tail of names that likely belong to nonwhites.20
To increase power over any individual race measure, we use an index constructed by
estimating the first principal component (PC1) of the three race measures, rescaled to the
unit interval to permit interpretation, as our baseline measure of delegate-candidate race
throughout the results presented in Section 4. We report the results from the principal com-
ponent analysis, including for the detailed race categories, in Appendix Table A7. Overall,
we find that same-race, di↵erent-measure correlations—for instance, the MTurk black mea-
sure’s correlation with the Census black measure—are robustly positive. Our interpretation
of these results is that all three measures capably di↵erentiate between white and nonwhite
names, and among detailed nonwhite categories, but with substantial noise that will bias
19See Appendix Figures A3 and A4 for histograms of SSA percent female and modal year of birth.
20Appendix Table A6 gives examples of highly suggestive names for all racial and ethnic categories.
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Table 3: Whitest and Least White Names of Delegate Candidates
Census MTurk
Name Whiteness Name Whiteness
Whitest Carol Hornickle 0.9946 Jill Bess 1
Brian Milleville 0.9956 Helen Manson 1
Sherry Hellmuth 0.9958 Mike Marron 1
Ralph Baahlmann 0.9972 William S. Graham 1
Gregory Musinski 0.9942 David L. Snyder 1
Least White Baba Padmanabhan 0.0141 Noella Chung 0
Ji Chung 0.0234 Angel Garcia 0
Neil V. Patel 0.0155 Gustavo Gonzalez 0
Noella Chung 0.0234 Rafael Rivadeneira 0
Steve H. Kim 0.0260 Raja Sadiq 0
Notes: This table lists the five whitest and least white delegate names using the two continuous race
measures in this paper. For the Census data, whiteness is defined as the proportion of U.S. citizens with
the delegate’s last name who are non-Hispanic white. For the MTurk data, whiteness is defined as the
proportion of Turkers who perceive the full name as non-Hispanic white. Ties are resolved by random
draws. The categorical definition of Onolytics race variable means there is no equivalent ranking of names
by informativeness. For further detail by race category, see Appendix Table A6.
our estimates toward zero, motivating the use of principal component analysis to extract the
common signal.
Using the modal guesses of delegate race from the MTurk data, the delegate population
is 94 percent non-Hispanic white, 1 percent black, 4 percent Hispanic, and 1 percent Asian.
Appendix Table A8 reports further summary statistics on delegates. Appendix Table A9
shows that likely-nonwhite delegates are nominated by nearly all the presidential candidates
in our sample. Our results are thus not driven by a single presidential candidate’s voters.
3.6 Where and Why Minority Delegates Are Nominated
Campaigns recruit and nominate delegates. This introduces the potential for two varieties
of selection. First, the nonwhite or female delegates that candidates select may di↵er from
the white and male delegates. We take up this concern in Section 4.3. Our results weigh
strongly against the presence of important confounding delegate-level unobservables.
Another form of selection is that campaigns may be more likely to nominate nonwhite
or female delegates in areas of Illinois with specific characteristics. This presents a threat
to external validity but, importantly, would not bias our results due to the presence of fixed
e↵ects which restrict our comparisons to within-cell variation. We evaluate this external-
validity concern in Appendix G. We regress the shares of nonwhite and female delegates on
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several county–district observable characteristics, including the white and college-educated
shares of population, white per-capita income, and the Republican two-party vote share.
We find that campaigns frequently nominate nonwhites and women throughout the state,
although relatively more frequently in less-Republican areas. We detect no other di↵erences.
The degree of selection of cells into the identifying set is su ciently mild that the set of
cells that contribute to identification closely matches of Illinois on average. In addition,
we provide direct evidence that selection on county–district observables is not a threat to
external validity with respect to Illinois statewide. Using coarsened exact matching, we
reweight the sample so that cells with likely-nonwhite delegates match Illinois statewide on
the four observables above. We estimate a similar penalty against nonwhites, implying that
nonwhites are not more likely to run in areas where voter discrimination is lower.
If voters discriminate against nonwhite candidates, why would campaigns nominate
them? In discussions with several o cials responsible for recruiting delegate candidates,
we found that recruitment costs were a common explanation, consistent with our finding in
Appendix G that nonwhites were more likely to be nominated in less-Republican areas, where
the supply of Republicans who could serve as delegate candidates may be more limited.21
4 Racial and Gender Discrimination by Voters
4.1 Empirical Strategy
To estimate the e↵ects of discrimination on voting behavior, we compare the vote totals of
delegates who di↵er in race, ethnicity, or gender but are in the same “cell”: delegates running
in the same county–district, in the same year, for the same presidential candidate, and for
the same potential set of regular or alternate delegate positions—all of whom voters should
select to maximize the value of their ballot. Our baseline Poisson regression specification is:
E[Votesipct] = exp
 
  · Nonwhitei +   · Femalei +X0ipct  + ↵pct
 
, (1)
where Nonwhitei and Femalei are our proxy variables for whether voters believe delegate i is
nonwhite and female, respectively. ↵pct is a vector of cell fixed e↵ects, where p denotes the
21Campaigns must secure three supporters to run in every congressional district months before the primary
takes place, and these delegates must agree to pay their own travel and lodging to attend the convention if
elected. Campaigns therefore face search costs in locating delegates willing to serve. In addition, Illinois cam-
paign managers as agents may not fully internalize the presidential candidates’ incentives. For example, the
Trump campaign appears to have recruited from a campaign email list (Brueggeman, Brian. 5 March 2016.
“Meet your delegates: the people who will vote for presidential candidates at the conventions.” Belleville
[IL] News-Democrat). Appendix H further argues delegate service is a form of hobbyist consumption.
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presidential candidate, c the county–district, and t the election year. For our estimates of  
and   to be unbiased, race and gender must be uncorrelated with unobservable determinants
of votes. To show robustness, we add a vector of covariates Xipct in some specifications.
Estimates of   and   can be interpreted as the average percentage of votes lost or gained
due to discrimination by race and gender. Since all our race measures are scaled to the
unit interval, the coe cients represent the estimated di↵erence between a certainly-white
and a certainly-nonwhite candidate. In alternative specifications, we replace Nonwhitei with
variables for specific nonwhite race and ethnicity groups. The dependent variable is the vote
count for a delegate, and the unit of observation is the county–district-delegate-year.22 Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the delegate level, as this is the level at which the “treatment,”
a delegate’s race, is assigned.23 The presence of cell fixed e↵ects in all regressions ensures
that coe cients reported in the tables only exploit variation in the performance of delegate
candidates within the same cell.
4.2 Main Results
Table 4 presents our main results. Column 1 reports estimates of Equation 1 using the
share of MTurkers who perceived each delegate as nonwhite. The coe cient implies that
if two delegates were running in the same cell but all MTurkers perceived one as white
and the other as nonwhite, the latter would receive approximately 8.7 percent fewer votes
in these elections. Column 2 breaks down these estimates by delegate race and ethnicity.
Due to the small number of likely-black delegate candidates, our estimate of discrimination
against black candidates is relatively imprecise. Delegates with names MTurkers perceive as
Asian and especially as Indian and Middle Eastern appear to perform much worse than their
counterparts running to represent the same candidates, receiving about 15 percent fewer
votes than white delegates in the same cell. Using our SSA data on the female share of
first names to code delegates who are objectively likely to be female, we find little evidence
for discrimination against women in both Columns 1 and 2. Conditional on being in the
22Other specifications, such as unweighted OLS on the number of votes or on log votes, would not estimate
a meaningful quantity of interest due to heterogeneity in the number of votes by presidential candidate. See
Appendix Tables A10 and A11 for OLS regressions with two alternative dependent variables, respectively
vote shares and ln(1 + votes), weighted by votes. Both find similar results.
23We cluster standard errors at this level because the implied randomized experiment is that the same in-
dividual delegate candidates were randomly assigned to switch race or gender with other delegate candidates
running in their same cell. We present a permutation test later in the paper that implements this implied
experiment under the sharp null hypothesis. Appendix Table A14 reports our main results clustering at
the level of congressional district, presidential candidate, alternate or regular, and year, which replicates the
“slate” of delegates chosen by the same presidential candidate and competing for the same position. We find
this increases standard errors by only about 20 percent on average and thus leaves the significance of our
results almost entirely unchanged.
19
Table 4: E↵ect of Delegate Candidate Race and Gender on Votes, by Race and Ethnicity Measure
MTurk Census Onolytics Rescaled PC1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Female 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Nonwhite -0.087*** -0.045*** -0.035*** -0.092***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.007) (0.016)
Black -0.033 0.018 -0.040*** -0.094***
(0.050) (0.025) (0.015) (0.032)
Hispanic/Latino -0.057*** -0.061*** -0.045*** -0.079***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.012) (0.018)
Any Asian -0.069*** -0.110***
(0.014) (0.022)
East Asian -0.093*** -0.055***
(0.025) (0.008)
Indian -0.174*** -0.076***
(0.040) (0.013)
Middle Eastern -0.160*** -0.088***
(0.031) (0.033)
White Ethnic -0.016*
(0.009)
N 18,958 18,958 16,945 11,166 18,639 18,639 16,668 11,049
Pseudo-R2 0.991 0.991 0.991 0.992 0.991 0.991 0.991 0.992
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating Equation 1, yielding estimates of the percentage vote penalties by nonwhite race or ethnicity and by gender. “Any
Asian” uses the Census definition of Asian race, which spans our subsequent categories of East Asian, Indian, and Middle Eastern. Column 7 provides our preferred estimates
throughout this paper. In all regressions the dependent variable is the vote count for the delegate. The unit of observation is the county–district-delegate-year. All regressions
include cell-level FEs. Delegates are defined as in the same cell if they run in the same county–district, in the same year, for the same presidential candidate, and for the same
potential set of regular or alternate delegate positions. Sample sizes change because not all delegate names can be classified using the Census data or Onolytics algorithm.
Appendix Table A13 shows versions of Columns 7 and 8 that estimate the female and race/ethnicity coe cients in separate rather than combined regressions. Standard errors
are clustered at the delegate level. * = p < 0.10, ** = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01.
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same cell, likely-female delegates receive approximately the same average number of votes
as likely-male delegates. Appendix Table A15 shows that interactions between delegate race
and gender are insignificant.
In Columns 3 and 4, we present our estimates using Census data to code the racial
information in delegates’ last names. The sample is limited to delegates whose last names
match the Census data exactly. Similar to the MTurk measure, we find that nonwhite
delegate candidates receive fewer votes. On average, a delegate who was objectively likely to
be nonwhite would receive approximately 4.5 percent fewer votes than a delegate objectively
likely to be white. We find significant discrimination against delegates likely to be Hispanic
or Asian, but Census data struggle to identify delegates likely to be black by last name.24
We again find a tight zero for discrimination against women.
In Columns 5 and 6, we present estimates using the dichotomous Onolytics race cate-
gories. As we found using the MTurk and Census race variables, we estimate that delegate
candidates identified by the Onolytics algorithm as nonwhite receive fewer votes. Broken
down by ethnicity, we find significant shares of voters do not vote for black, Hispanic/Latino,
Asian, Indian, and Middle Eastern delegate candidates. We also break out a “white eth-
nic” category but find only a weakly significant di↵erence in votes between “ethnic” and
“non-ethnic” whites. The null result for women is unchanged.
Columns 7 and 8 present estimates using the rescaled PC1 measure. In Column 7, which
provides the preferred estimates of this paper, the coe cient on nonwhite implies that dele-
gate candidates who are generally identified as nonwhite across the three measures receive 9.2
percent fewer votes.25 We also obtain a precise point estimate of zero discrimination against
female delegates. In Column 8, we break this result down by the three racial categories
common across our three measures. We find significant discrimination against delegates of
all three racial categories. We also treat these estimates as our preferred results for the
detailed categories throughout the rest of the paper.
The large change in the black coe cient when using the PC1 index is due to the substan-
tial measurement error in our measures for this category and by a small number of outlier
observations that influence our rescaling of the PC1 index. Given these challenges, our esti-
mates for discrimination against black delegates should be interpreted with caution. More
generally, di↵erences in sample coverage and di↵erences in how variables measure race and
24Although the mean percentage black by last name in Census data is 9.8 percent, the 95th-percentile
black last name is only 35 percent black.
25To guard against bias in our standard error estimates, we also conduct a permutation test in which we
repeatedly re-randomize the PC1 race measure at the delegate level within district-presidential candidate-
years. Appendix Figure A6 plots 10,000 draws from a Monte Carlo simulation of the main regression
specification with treatment status permuted in this way. Our standard errors appear unbiased relative to
the bootstrap. The estimated e↵ect remains significant.
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ethnicity explain di↵erences in estimated coe cients.26
The PC1 index is missing when any of its constituent parts are missing, as the Onolytics
or Census exact measures sometimes are. The gender measure is also missing for some
delegates, as previously noted. Appendix Table A16 shows that imputing missing values
for the PC1 index and for gender does not change the results. In Appendix I, we correct
our estimates for the attenuation introduced by measurement error, defined either narrowly
in the sampling of the MTurk race measure or more broadly in using the first principal
component of the three race measures to proxy for true perceived race, a latent variable.27
Appendix Table A17 shows that our main results are essentially unchanged if the race and
gender variables are dichotomized.
4.3 Robustness Checks
Our research design absorbs into fixed e↵ects all attributes that may a↵ect voting behavior,
such as attributes of presidential candidates, but do not vary among delegate candidates who
appear on the same ballots, in front of the same voters, in the same geographic areas, and
bound to the same presidential candidates. A potential confound must therefore cause some
delegate candidates to receive more or fewer votes than same-race or same-gender delegate
candidates in the same cell and be correlated with delegate-candidate race or gender.
4.3.1 Di↵erences in Local Political Networks
One such possible confound is a racial or gender di↵erential in local political networks and
serves to illustrate the main empirical challenge to our results. If white delegate candidates
are better known to voters than nonwhite delegate candidates, for instance, and voters are
more likely to vote for delegate candidates whose names they recognize, then the coe cient
on candidate race would capture the e↵ect of the racial di↵erential in local political networks
26For example, the Census race measure is constructed exclusively from delegate last names, although for
some groups (e.g., blacks), first names are a stronger signal of race. In addition, the MTurk measure captures
some di↵erences between how individuals perceive race and ethnicity from names that diverge from objective
data. For instance, a majority of MTurk respondents perceived a delegate with the last name “Mercadante”
as Hispanic, but the name, per Onolytics, is Italian in origin and is coded by the Census as white.
27We find that attenuation due to sampling is trivial. Attenuation due to noisy proxies for perceived
race, however, may be substantial. A correction using Cronbach’s (1951) ↵ implies that being perceived as
nonwhite may reduce the number of votes a delegate receives by 11 percent. Being perceived as black, most
notably, may reduce the number of votes by 41 percent. Estimates for Hispanics/Latinos and Asians, whose
names more clearly indicate race, rise by comparatively less. These estimates require the strong assumption
that disagreement among the race measures is entirely classical measurement error. If the non-common
components of these measures a↵ect voting with the same sign as the common component, the reliability
correction will overstate the true magnitude of discrimination. The estimates we report in Appendix I are
therefore most reasonably viewed as upper bounds.
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as well as the direct e↵ect of delegate-candidate race. A parallel logic could apply for gender.
We take three approaches to addressing this possibility.
First, since delegate candidates who campaigns repeatedly decide to list across multiple
elections are plausibly more likely to be public o cials or have other unobservable qualities
that would increase vote totals, we introduce a fixed e↵ect for candidates who run in more
than one election year in our sample as a lightweight test of whether voters have information
about delegate candidates other than the name-implied race and gender that they use to
determine their votes. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5, which use the PC1 race measure, show
that our results for both nonwhites and women are essentially unchanged when we control
for repeat candidates. While repeat delegate candidates receive significantly more votes,
repeat delegate status is not strongly correlated with either delegate race or gender.28
Second, Columns 3–6 of Table 5 control for voters’ delegate-level prior information using
our delegate “background checks,” as described in Section 2.4, which exhaustively collected
information on other o ces or political roles held by delegates. In Columns 3 and 4 we
include indicators for each of the 17 types of o ces we recorded. We find significant returns
to o ceholding, in line with the literature on candidate name recognition (e.g., Panagopoulos
and Green, 2008). Accounting for di↵erential o ceholding by race and gender modestly
increases our estimate of discrimination against nonwhites but, in contrast, suggests that
women receive 2 percent more votes than comparable men, a significant di↵erence.29 In
Columns 7 and 8, we drop from the sample every delegate for whom we were able to find
had held or previously ran for any o ce, no matter how minor. Among the delegates about
which voters plausibly know nothing other than the information on the ballot—their names
and the presidential candidate to which they are bound—nonwhite delegates still receive
about 10 percent fewer votes than white delegates. Such female delegates receive about 2–3
percent more votes than comparable male delegates.
It remains possible that white or female delegates are more likely to be highly-connected
individuals in ways our “background checks” could not capture but that would increase
their vote totals. We provide further evidence against this possibility by exploiting the facts
that some congressional districts in our sample span large areas, often hundreds of miles
from end to end, and that we can observe outcomes by county within each congressional
district. Highly-connected individuals should benefit from connections principally in their
home counties, and indeed we find delegates receive 8 percent more votes in their home
counties as recorded in o cial candidacy filings. In Columns 7 and 8 of Table 5, we show
28Appendix Table A18 reports the coe cients on the covariate terms.
29This point estimate matches the small advantage female candidates enjoy on average in survey-based
experiments, per a recent meta-analysis (Schwarz and Coppock, 2019).
23
Table 5: Robustness Checks
With Controls For:
Repeat Candidates O ceholders Non-Home Counties Only Ballot Order
Control Non-O ceholders Only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Female 0.006 0.002 0.020⇤⇤⇤ 0.020⇤⇤⇤ 0.031⇤⇤⇤ 0.019⇤⇤⇤ -0.002 -0.002 0.010⇤ 0.009⇤
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Nonwhite -0.088⇤⇤⇤ -0.099⇤⇤⇤ -0.099⇤⇤⇤ -0.096⇤⇤⇤ -0.101⇤⇤⇤
(0.017) (0.015) (0.019) (0.022) (0.014)
Black -0.095⇤⇤⇤ -0.070⇤⇤⇤ -0.056 -0.081⇤⇤ -0.073⇤⇤⇤
(0.033) (0.026) (0.040) (0.035) (0.027)
Hispanic/Latino -0.074⇤⇤⇤ -0.080⇤⇤⇤ -0.059⇤⇤⇤ -0.078⇤⇤⇤ -0.087⇤⇤⇤
(0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.024) (0.008)
Asian -0.100⇤⇤⇤ -0.095⇤⇤⇤ -0.173⇤⇤ -0.224⇤⇤⇤ -0.113⇤⇤⇤
(0.023) (0.020) (0.083) (0.057) (0.022)
N 16,668 11,049 16,668 11,049 8,091 5,068 14,422 9,536 16,668 11,049
Pseudo-R2 0.991 0.992 0.992 0.992 0.995 0.994 0.990 0.990 0.991 0.992
Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 1 with varying sets of controls or sample restrictions. In all regressions above, the
dependent variable is the vote count for the delegate and the race measure used is the rescaled PC1 measure. The unit of observation is the county–
district-delegate-year. For coe cients on controls, see Appendix Table A18. All regressions include cell-level FEs. Delegates are defined as in the
same cell if they run in the same county–district, in the same year, for the same presidential candidate, and for the same potential set of regular or
alternate delegate positions. Standard errors are clustered at the delegate level. * = p < 0.10, ** = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01.
24
our results are robust to dropping delegates’ home counties, suggesting our results are likely
robust to any racial or gender di↵erences in unobservable local political networks.
In summary, these tests of observable and unobservable di↵erences among candidates
suggest that our estimates of discrimination are unlikely to be confounded by di↵erences in
o ceholding or voter information. We find that our estimates of racial discrimination remain
unchanged with controls for possible sources of this variation and that these possible sources
appear uncorrelated with delegate race and ethnicity.30 On the other hand, controlling
for o ceholding leads us to find significant, if small, discrimination towards women, rather
than the null result before controlling for o ceholding, as female delegates are less likely than
male delegates to hold o ces with substantial electoral returns in the context of this primary.
We interpret these results as ambiguous with respect to whether there is no discrimination
against women or discrimination towards them.
4.3.2 Ballot Order E↵ects
Another potential confound stems from ballot order e↵ects (Miller and Krosnick, 1998), in
which delegate candidates may receive more or fewer votes as a causal result of their ordinal
position on the ballot. In particular, if presidential campaigns place nonwhite delegate
candidates into their lowest positions on ballots, then the coe cient estimate on having a
nonwhite name would be inflated by the indirect e↵ect of ballot order. However, Appendix
Table A12 shows that, conditional on the number of ballot slots available (2, 3, or 4), delegate
race and ballot order are uncorrelated, as are delegate gender and ballot order. We augment
our specification in Equation 1 with controls for ballot order using dummy variables for the
rank (1–4) of a delegate among those in the same cell and interact these with the maximum
number of delegates (2–4) for whom a voter may vote in a given congressional district and
year. Columns 9 and 10 of Table 5 report these results. Our findings change little when
controlling for ballot-order e↵ects.
4.3.3 Other Types of Discrimination
Voters may have preferences over other attributes of candidates, such as age, education, or
income. In Section 3, we describe our data on these attributes: We use the age that voters
might infer from a delegate’s first name and the block-group characteristics of the delegate’s
o cial residential address as proxies of their education and income. To the extent that voters
know the socioeconomic status of delegates, these measures allow us to detect whether there
30This implies nothing about whether nonwhites are unconditionally more or less likely to serve in gov-
ernment or party o ces in Illinois—only that, conditional on being nominated as a delegate, nonwhites and
whites have similar o ceholding profiles.
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is discrimination on these dimensions. Appendix Table A19 reports our results: We find
precise nulls on discrimination by estimated age, education, and income.
These results suggest our estimates of racial discrimination are unlikely to be contami-
nated by discrimination on characteristics correlated with race, such as age or socioeconomic
status. Fryer and Levitt (2004) demonstrate this threat to inference by showing that black
Americans whose parents give them racially-distinctive first names are lower on average in
socioeconomic status. In our context, this concern is relatively unlikely a priori. Our es-
timates are mostly driven by racial minorities other than blacks and remain robust when
we use the Census measure, which is based on last names only, indicating that inferences
about status from distinctively-black first names do not drive the results. Furthermore, our
estimates for discrimination against East Asians and Indians—who have higher median in-
come than whites on average both in the U.S. in general and in Illinois specifically—are still
significant and negative.
4.4 Residual Incentives for Statistical Discrimination
While the design of the primary suggests taste-based discrimination as the likely mechanism
for our findings, we discuss here the possibility that voters have residual incentives for sta-
tistical discrimination. In Appendix J, we also discuss other alternative interpretations: (1)
that voters are making inferences about presidential candidates from delegates, (2) unob-
served confounds in general, (3) the implications of voter indi↵erence between Presidential
candidates, (4) whether voters use delegate voting to send signals to presidential candidates
or party elites, and (5) whether voters understand whether delegate voting has stakes. There
we also report an original survey of self-identified Illinois Republican primary voters.
An interpretation of the discrimination we observed as taste-based relies upon the as-
sumption that rational voters have minimal incentives to engage in statistical discrimination.
Following Becker’s (1957) definitions of taste-based and statistical discrimination as with re-
spect to how one would interpret observed behavior as if it were undertaken by rational
agents, it is di cult to see why a rational agent in this setting would perceive incentives
for statistical discrimination. Even a rational agent who misunderstood the institution, not
knowing that delegates were bound, would need to maintain very unlikely beliefs: A sub-
stantial fraction of rational agents would need to believe that white delegates selected by
the opposing candidates would be more likely to vote for their candidate of choice at the
convention than nonwhite delegates selected by their candidate of choice. Moreover, as the
elections we study had largely narrowed to two contenders, voters who believed delegates
were likely to abstain or defect to their preferred presidential candidate’s rival have only
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the alternative of helping that rival. Under such conditions, it would not be su cient for a
voter to believe nonwhite delegates were more likely to defect than white delegates for the
same presidential candidate. For example, to explain our results in 2012, rational voters
would need to believe both that delegates were able to change conventional rules and exert
discretion and that, once doing so, the nonwhite delegates Mitt Romney had selected were
less likely to vote for Romney at the convention than the white delegates Rick Santorum
had selected were to desert Santorum in order to vote for Romney.31 That convention rules
do not allow delegates to engage in this behavior in the first place makes it all the more
implausible.32
Several pieces of empirical evidence also are inconsistent with the presence of statistical
discrimination. First, that our estimates do not meaningfully vary with the ideological
positions of the candidates—as measured by ideology scores compiled by Bonica (2013),
as we show in Section 5—is inconsistent with voters inferring nonwhites are more likely
to abandon conservative presidential candidates to vote for liberals; voters voting for more
liberal Republican presidential candidates discriminate no less. This result also suggests our
findings are unlikely to come from voters concerned that nonwhite delegates would move
party ideology left or right through their presence at the convention or in potential future
political careers. Second, in Appendix J we present results from a survey we conducted of a
convenience sample of Illinois Republican primary voters that finds that perceived di↵erences
in the loyalty of white versus nonwhite delegates are much too small to plausibly explain
our finding of discrimination against nonwhite delegates. In contrast, about 10 percent
of voters instead said they would avoid voting for nonwhite delegates because they were
“uncomfortable” doing so, despite potential social desirability bias, consistent with “psychic
costs.” Third, although the risk of further rounds of convention balloting (sometimes called
a “contested convention”) was heightened in 2016, Table A25 finds that voter discrimination
does not vary meaningfully across years, including in 2000, 2008, and 2012 when the risk
of further rounds of balloting at the convention was not considered plausible by the time
31A corollary of this observation is that even if one were to adopt a broader definition of statistical
discrimination that includes choices stemming from mistaken beliefs (Bohren et al., 2019), it seems unlikely
that behavioral voters with such beliefs would perceive incentives to discriminate.
32The sole case in which delegates do have discretion is if the convention is contested and goes to a second
round of voting. For example, in the 2016 presidential nominating contest, some observers anticipated
a possibility that no presidential candidate would receive a majority of votes on the first ballot at the
convention, “un-binding” delegates for subsequent rounds of voting. However, as reviewed in Appendix
C, the primary race had progressed su ciently to a two-candidate race by the time Illinois voted in 2000,
2008, and 2012 that multiple rounds of balloting were essentially impossible, and our estimates remain
largely unchanged when examining the two frontrunners in these years only. Moreover, the last contested
Republican convention was in 1952, and the last one close to contestation was in 1976. Given the elections
in our dataset, it seems a priori unlikely that voting behavior in Illinois was informed by the possibility of
second-round convention balloting.
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Illinois voted. Finally, our discussion of the nature of convention in Appendix H shows that
voters who discriminate are unlikely to be trying to prevent political power from accruing
to nonwhites.
5 Heterogeneity in Discrimination
We next estimate how racial and gender discrimination varies along several dimensions. Al-
though some of these tests have low statistical power and we caution that they are fundamen-
tally observational in nature, their results are consistent with a taste-based interpretation.
5.1 By Presidential Candidate Race and Gender
Would the discrimination we observe in these delegate elections also manifest in other voting
decisions, such as in choices between presidential candidates themselves? If our estimates
reflect discriminatory tastes, and if these discriminatory tastes also influence voters’ choices of
presidential candidates, we would expect presidential primary candidates who are nonwhite
or female to attract voter populations with weaker tastes against nonwhites and stronger
tastes towards women on average than the voter populations of white or male presidential
candidates. We can test this prediction because the design of the primary allows us to
separately estimate the magnitudes of race and gender discrimination among voters for each
presidential candidate.33
In Column 1 of Table 6, we show that voters for nonwhite presidential candidates indeed
do not appear to have any racially discriminatory tastes on average, whereas voters for white
presidential candidates do. Column 1 estimates Equation 1 with an interaction term for the
race and ethnicity of the presidential candidate with the race of the delegate candidate as
well as controls for delegate o ceholding and ballot order. As with delegate candidates, for
concision we define presidential candidates as white if they are non-Hispanic whites alone.
We estimate that nonwhite delegates of white presidential candidates lost 10 percent of votes
due to discrimination. A  2-test rejects equality between delegates of white and nonwhite
presidential candidates. This suggests that voters for nonwhite presidential candidates have,
on average, weaker racial tastes than voters for white presidential candidates. Although we
cannot rule out other explanations for this pattern, it is consistent with our estimates of
discrimination as reflecting tastes that also a↵ect voters’ presidential candidate choices.
A similar result applies to women, consistent with the prediction that voters for female
33Appendix Figure A7 presents the estimated level of discrimination among voters for individual presi-
dential candidates.
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Table 6: Heterogeneous Treatment E↵ects by Presidential Candidate Race and Gender
(1) (2) (3)
Nonwhite Delegate
⇥ White Pres. Cand. -0.101*** -0.104***
(0.017) (0.017)
⇥ Nonwhite Pres. Cand. 0.052 0.053
(0.064) (0.069)
Female Delegate
⇥ Female Pres. Cand. 0.335*** 0.335***
(0.096) (0.109)
⇥ Male Pres. Cand. 0.003 0.003
(0.006) (0.007)
 2 test of equality 7.07*** 12.49*** 15.73***
N 17,126 18,958 16,668
Pseudo-R2 0.990 0.991 0.991
Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 1, interacting with the race and gender of pres-
idential candidates. We code Ben Carson, Ted Cruz, Alan Keyes, and Marco Rubio as nonwhite (including
Hispanic), Carly Fiorina as female, and the remaining 19 candidates as white men. The  2 test results also
include interactions of the nonwhite and gender variables with the year, thus exploiting only within-year
comparisons of presidential candidates by attribute. In all regressions the dependent variable is the vote
count for the delegate. The unit of observation is the county–district-delegate-year. All regressions include
controls for ballot order and detailed o ceholding and cell-level FEs. Delegates are defined as in the same
cell if they run in the same county–district, in the same year, for the same presidential candidate, and for the
same potential set of regular or alternate delegate positions. Standard errors are clustered at the delegate
level. * = p < 0.10, ** = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01.
presidential candidates may similarly be selected towards relatively pro-female tastes. How-
ever, there was only one female Republican presidential candidate whose delegates won any
votes in Illinois from 2000 to 2016, Carly Fiorina in 2016, and so our results come with
the immediate caveat that they rely upon vote totals for one female candidate. Comparing
the vote totals of female and male Fiorina delegates in the same cell, we find substantial
discrimination towards female delegates: We show in Column 2 of 6 that female Fiorina
delegates win about 35 percent more votes than otherwise-similar male Fiorina delegates, a
statistically significant but imprecise estimate. The di↵erence with non-Fiorina delegates is
also significant in a  2-test.34
We also investigate whether discrimination varies by presidential candidate ideology, cat-
egorizing moderate and conservative presidential candidates on either side of the median
34See Appendix Table A15 for evidence that the presence of Fiorina voters with the highest estimated bias
against nonwhites and for women is not explained by missing interaction terms.
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of ideology estimates inferred from the identities of campaign donors from Bonica (2013).
Reported in Appendix Table A21, the relationship is insignificant, suggesting little sorting
of voters who discriminate more according to left–right ideology. Importantly, this null re-
sult is also inconsistent with statistical discrimination wherein voters believe white delegates
are more conservative than nonwhite delegates. Voters for moderate presidential candidates
would have a weaker incentive to discriminate than voters for conservative presidential can-
didates, but we do not find this.35
5.2 By Competitiveness and the Costs of Discrimination
Taste-based theories of discrimination predict individuals discriminate less when it is more
costly for them to do so (Becker, 1957; Hedegaard and Tyran, 2018). In this setting, voters
face a trade-o↵ between any psychic costs of voting for nonwhites and the costs of engaging
in discrimination—one instrumental component of which is the possibility that withholding
their vote for their preferred presidential candidates’ minority delegates would prove de-
cisive, causing the delegates to lose and impairing their preferred presidential candidates’
nomination prospects. Other components of the cost of discrimination, such as the intrinsic
utility voters gain from the act of voting for their chosen candidate (Pons and Tricaud, 2018;
Spenkuch, 2018), do not vary with the probability voters will be decisive here.
To evaluate this prediction, we split presidential candidates by whether they received
above- or below-median shares of statewide votes in each respective election year. In our
context, below-median candidates have essentially no chance of winning delegates, and thus
their voters face lower instrumental costs of discrimination than voters for above-median
candidates. Appendix Table A21 presents results consistent with a downward-sloping de-
mand curve for taste-based discrimination: We estimate a 9-percent penalty for the nonwhite
delegates of above-median presidential candidates, compared to a penalty of 57 percent for
below-median candidates. A  2-test confirms this di↵erence is significant. When rational
voters with tastes against nonwhites vote in an election they expect to be close, they appear
to be more likely to prioritize the victory of their preferred presidential candidate over avoid-
ing the “psychic cost” of voting for nonwhites than when no delegates are plausibly at stake.
We interpret these patterns as suggestive evidence in favor of viewing the discrimination we
detect as taste-based and as politically consequential even in competitive elections.36
35A lack of other proxies for ideology which cover Republican presidential candidates constrains further
analysis of the relationship between ideology and discrimination.
36Discrimination persists even among the top two presidential candidates’ voters in each year (  =  0.087,
p < 0.001) as well as for the top presidential candidates’ voters (  =  0.083, p < 0.001). We repeat
this and the ideology analyses for gender in Appendix Table A21. Preventing further analysis of voter
responses to instrumental incentives, nearly all variation in pivot probability is at the candidate level, and
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5.3 By Geography
We also examine whether our area-level estimates of racial discrimination vary with popula-
tion attributes previous literature has identified: the share of the population that is white,
the share of the white population that has a college degree, and the real median per capita
income of whites. These are all measured by the U.S. Census at the county–district level.
To estimate how they correlate with discrimination, we modify Equation 1 by interacting
the nonwhite-delegate variable with our county–district-level demographic measures. In an
alternate specification, we also add delegate-level fixed e↵ects; since we observe vote counts
across counties within delegates, adding delegate fixed e↵ects allows electorate demography
to vary while holding delegate identities constant.
Appendix Table A23 reports these results. There is no significant association between
our county-level estimates of racial discrimination and the white share of population. Dis-
crimination is lower in areas with higher college-educated white shares of population, with
higher per-capita income of whites, and with lower two-party Republican presidential vote
shares, although significance is often sensitive to specification. These findings are consistent
with historical patterns wherein American political parties that explicitly appeal to racial
prejudice tend to perform better in lower-income areas (e.g., Mulkern, 1990). We find lit-
tle evidence that the e↵ect varies with the Stephens-Davidowitz (2014) or Xu et al. (2014)
measures of anti-black bias, perhaps because most of the nonwhite delegates in our sample
are not black.37
A parallel analysis of gender discrimination reaches similar conclusions. Appendix Table
A24 finds that discrimination towards female delegates is stronger in areas where the college
share of adults is higher and per-capita income is higher. These results, however, are not
robust in within-delegate analyses. In lieu of local measures of gender bias, we consider three
variables drawn from U.S. Census data: the adult sex ratio, the log male-female di↵erence in
annual labor earnings, and the male-female di↵erence in the percentage of individuals over
age 25 with at least a bachelor’s degree. We also consider the average Republican vote share.
within-candidate geographic variation is trivial. Another source of variation in the instrumental cost of
discrimination is whether or not the delegate position is for a regular or an alternate delegate. See Appendix
Table A22. We find only weak evidence for the hypothesis that racial and gender discrimination is greater
against alternate delegates than against regular delegates. In tension with our results for competitiveness,
the similarity of our estimates for alternates and delegates suggests an important role for disutility from
the mere act of voting for a nonwhite delegate, irrespective of their probability of serving. Given these null
results and the possibility that voters for presidential candidates who receive relatively few votes may have
relatively stronger tastes against minorities, we regard this analysis of instrumental costs as suggestive.
37The lack of correlation across these measures may be attributed variously to multidimensionality in the
concept of racial bias, to distinctions between anti-black bias and bias against the other nonwhite groups
examined in this paper, to measurement error in all three variables, or to potentially other factors. The
correlation between the Stephens-Davidowitz (2014) and Xu et al. (2014) measures is only 0.1.
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We find no association with gender discrimination for any of these variables in either the
pooled or within-delegate analyses.
5.4 Over Time
We estimate Equation 1 but interacting the nonwhite and female variables with year dum-
mies. Appendix Table A25 presents the estimates by year. An  2-test of the equality restric-
tion across years shows that we cannot reject either null hypothesis that discrimination is
constant over time. We also impose linear time trends on racial and gender discrimination,
starting from Equation 1, by interacting the variables with the continuous year variable. The
point estimates on these interaction terms are essentially zero for both race and gender.
6 Discussion
Our estimate of racial discrimination in these elections is large, comparable in magnitude to
the benefits in these elections of being a state legislator or running in one’s home county.
This section reviews the political and policy implications of our findings.38
We first evaluate the consequences of racial discrimination in Illinois Republican dele-
gate selection by simulating counterfactual outcomes absent discrimination. To simplify, we
assume delegates more likely than not to be nonwhite according to the MTurk race measure
all lost the same fraction of votes due to discrimination and then vary the estimated penalty
from 0 to  0.3. We augment their vote totals by these fractions, which assumes that discrim-
inating voters either undervote or proportionally vote for other delegates when nonwhites
are nominated. We then calculate which delegates would have won under these augmented
vote totals. This exercise suggests that discrimination reduced the number of nonwhites who
served: Appendix Figure A8 shows that, at our preferred estimate of discrimination against
nonwhite delegates of 9.2 percent, 5 additional nonwhite delegates would have won, relative
to the baseline of 34. In addition, discrimination reduces the appeal of election winners on
non-racial dimensions to voters who discriminate: We estimate that, due to discrimination,
several nonwhite delegates lost to white delegates bound to other presidential candidates.
Appendix Table A27 provides an example of one such likely change in outcomes. Voters in
38We caution these are partial-equilibrium analyses. For instance, incentives of presidential candidates
to nominate a nonwhite as a delegate, and those of nonwhite candidates to run for other o ces, may
also change in a counterfactual without voter racial discrimination. Plausible general-equilibrium e↵ects in
other elections, such as on the margins of nonwhite candidate entry or institutional design (Trebbi et al.,
2008), could mean our estimate of the increase in nonwhite representation from the elimination of racial
discrimination could be over- or understated.
32
this setting appear willing to discriminate despite the potential for discrimination to change
outcomes and advantage disfavored presidential candidates.
Beyond the narrow context of Illinois Republican primaries, discrimination of the mag-
nitude we observed would also be large enough to represent a substantial barrier to the
election of racial minorities in other elections. Appendix Table A26 presents back-of-the-
envelope calculations that use U.S. House primaries from 1990 to 2010 to illustrate the
potential magnitude of that barrier. As these calculations require the strong assumption
that our estimate of discrimination in Illinois delegate-primary elections is valid for U.S.
House primaries, we o↵er them to contextualize the substantive importance of our estimated
magnitude of discrimination, not to reach precise conclusions about nonwhite representation
in the U.S. House in a counterfactual world without racial discrimination. We estimate non-
whites would have won 19 additional Republican U.S. House primaries from 1990 to 2010
absent racial discrimination of the size we observed in this setting. This would result in
an increase of about 9 percent in the number of nonwhites winning Republican primaries
(19/218 = 0.087). These comparisons suggest racial discrimination is plausibly a critical
barrier to minority political o ceholding, which other research shows lies at the root of
important political and economic racial disparities.
Would such discrimination manifest in other elections? Encouragingly for the external
validity of our findings, we found that voters appear to select out of voting for nonwhite and
female presidential candidates in a manner correlated with our estimates of their collective
racial and gender tastes, consistent with discriminatory tastes having stakes for presidential
candidate choices. Of course, many considerations influence whether discrimination is likely
to be greater or smaller in magnitude in other elections. Both costs and benefits of dis-
crimination to voters may vary. On the one hand, discrimination could be greater in other
elections where voters may have less information or weaker preferences. For example, voters
may know less about candidates in state legislative primaries than in presidential primaries
and therefore have weaker candidate preferences; all else equal, we would expect greater
discrimination there. Likewise, our estimates would not capture behavior arising from the
anticipated psychic costs of having nonwhite o ceholders, nor from any statistical discrimi-
nation against them. On the other hand, discrimination could be smaller in general elections
where partisan preferences may be more important, or in elections where voters have on av-
erage weaker racial tastes. For example, in a general election between a nonwhite Republican
and a white Democrat, Republican voters with strong racial tastes may still prefer paying
the psychic costs of voting for the nonwhite candidate to voting for a Democrat.
In the U.S., credible evidence about discrimination in elections also has significant policy
implications. The U.S. Congress and the Supreme Court regularly consult academic assess-
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ments of voter discrimination in crafting and reviewing American election laws. Our results
are most relevant to the debate over the Voting Rights Act of 1965, passed in part to facili-
tate the election of nonwhites to political o ce.39 In the subsequent decades, Congress and
the Court have evaluated the continuing necessity of the Act in part by attempting to answer
whether nonwhite candidates still encounter discrimination in elections. In decisions in 2009
and 2013, the Supreme Court struck down portions of the Act, finding only “decades-old
data” in support of federal claims of continued discrimination. Our findings are particularly
applicable to vote-dilution cases under the Act in which plainti↵s seek the construction of
majority–minority districts. First, our finding of racial and ethnic discrimination in voting
behavior may meet evidentiary standards for injury often di cult to meet with existing
correlational evidence. Second, by estimating significant discrimination against several non-
white minority groups, we provide evidence of shared injury, often the relevant legal burden
in “coalitional” cases brought jointly by minority groups under the Act.
Looking beyond the Act, our findings suggest policy responses that operate only on
informational margins to reduce statistical discrimination, however e↵ective (Casey, 2015),
are likely to leave intact substantial barriers to the election of racial and ethnic minorities
arising from taste-based discrimination. However, our work lends support to other work that
finds political parties may be a more relevant constraint on female representation than voters
(Baltrunaite et al., 2014, 2019; Esteve-Volart and Bagues, 2012; Casas-Arce and Saiz, 2015;
Besley et al., 2017; Bhalotra et al., 2017; Schwarz and Coppock, 2019). The contrasting
evidence that voters discriminate by race and ethnicity suggests that di↵erent interventions
may be necessary to address nonwhite and female underrepresentation in political o ce.
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